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Abstract
Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) in mobile
platforms typically restrict undesired information flow
based on its sensitivity. However, sensitivity is often
regarded as dichotomous and inflexible to the everchanging contexts. Improving the effectiveness of PETs
requires a better understanding of these contexts. In
this paper, we examine the influence of contextual
factors in users’ mobile usage based on Nissenbaum’s
framework of contextual integrity. Specifically, we
conducted a user study (n = 2889) to investigate the
influence of relevance of information types on the
willingness of disclosure towards typical groups of
recipient. While the results suggest a significant
relationship between information relevance (of
different information) and willingness to disclose (to
different recipients), closer examination reveals the
relationship is not always clear-cut, and there is a
potential
influence
of
recipient.
Therefore,
incorporating the recipient factor can serve as a
potential improvement to the existing approach in
privacy management in the mobile device.

1. Introduction
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) in the
mobile platforms often relies on permissions
management to restrict undesired information flow.
However, the current approach in permissions
management alone is not optimal as it often regards
data ‘privacy’ as dichotomies—sensitive and nonsensitive, risky and non-risk, private (personal) and
not-private, identifiable and non-identifiable—where
only one half warrant privacy consideration. In the
mobile platforms, users are usually prompted with
consent dialogue or permission prompt whenever an
app request for ‘sensitive’ data for the first time.
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Classifying the sensitivity or riskiness of
information leads to a troubling issue. Sensitive
information is often predefined by the respective OS
platform. However, what information constitute as
sensitive is subject to the users’ varying privacy
preferences and may also vary according to
circumstances. A study [1] found data sensitivity did
not significantly affect the willingness to disclose. This
suggests that relying on predefined sensitive
information may be impractical in serving a broad user
base. Sensitive information is often deemed so because
it is identifiable, but this assumption could not apply as
any piece of information is potentially an identifier or
at least a quasi-identifier [2]. Piecing together related
quasi-identifiers would paint a more comprehensive
picture of an individual, resulting in an ensuing of
privacy loss, regardless of the person’s intent.
When a type of information is regarded as
identifiable, it can become sensitive when disclosing it
“may result in harm to its subjects” [3]. However,
predicting which type of information can inflict harm
is subjective and may not always consistent [4, 5].
Similarly, The OECD Privacy Framework [6] also
clarified that certain data could become sensitive
depending on the context and use, despite not being so
at first glance. Even classification of private
information is also problematic, whereby “the same
information may be regarded as very private in one
context and not so private or not private at all in
another” [7]. Users often consider “a richer space of
information” before disclosing a piece of information
through a mobile device, instead of just taking into
account of “sensitivity” [8].
Thus, defining privacy by sensitivity alone is
problematic because sensitivity is usually at the
discretion of the provider, who may not always act in
the consumer’s best interests [9-11]. There is also an
inherent limitation in computing sensitivity as nuances

Page 4632

of social interaction are often abstracted away [12],
bounded by statistical models and computing
resources. Even back in 1969, the measure of
“sensitivity” is already recognized as being vary
“…depends in large measure upon the context in which
it was first given, and the context in which it is later
used” [13]. Another contentious issue is that there is no
universal definition of “privacy” [7, 14-16], let alone
the definition of “sensitivity” (in the context of PET).
Contextual integrity [17] evaluates whether the
flow of information is appropriate in a given context.
Contexts, actors, attributes and transmission principles
are the key factors in shaping the informational norms.
The framework evaluates, in a given context, which
sender (actor) can share what type of information
(attribute) with which recipient (actor) regarding
whose information (subject) under certain conditions
(transmission principles). It suggests that public outcry
will erupt whenever there is a violation of an
information norm. We can utilize this property to
identify privacy violation that is dependent on the
current social norm, without subscribing to a rigid
definition of privacy. As such, we can construe CI as a
“framework for socially regulating information flows
that is legitimate separately from the contest over
‘privacy’” [18].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 reports on
Study 1. Section 4 contains Study 2. Section 5
discusses the results of the user studies. Section 6
concludes this work.

2. Background
In our previous study [19], while there was
evidence of demographical differences on trust,
privacy concern and self-disclosure, we did not find
any evidence to suggest demographic backgrounds
significantly predict those three factors. The lack of
evidence suggests it may not be helpful to categorize
users and caution the use of privacy profiling adopted
in privacy recommendation systems. The mediation
effect—as evidenced in our result—was significant
regardless of demographic. Our findings, in a way, are
consistent with [4] that show consumer across those
categories (including those so-called ‘unconcerned’)
could share a similar view on privacy expectations. In
a series of studies conducted by [20], the results
suggested individuals’ privacy preferences are not
necessarily relevant to the disclosure decision. This
further demonstrates classifying consumer by privacy
preference or concern is not effective.
The results also suggest trust having a significant
influence on the user’s disclosure behavior, particularly
on the relationship between privacy concern and self-

disclosure. The mediation effect of trust in our results
suggest its significant role in determining users’ selfdisclosure despite the existence of privacy concern.
Our results, to some extent, are in line with an SNS
study that argued that privacy concern might not
necessarily inhibit self-disclosure [21, 22].
Existing studies have shown users often assess an
information flow based on diverse contextual factors.
A series of studies [23, 24] showed a significant
influence of purpose on users’ subjective judgement.
This is also in line with [25] that showed users are
more willing to disclose information when it is
perceived to be relevant to the function provided by the
receiving service provider. These studies, in a way,
also suggest users are increasingly demanding mobile
apps to be more upfront about information request.
This is evident in a study [8] where the results suggest
users consider app visibility as an essential factor in
deciding on permission request, as users are usually not
comfortable with an app collecting data in the
background. A study on personal health data [1]
showed participants considered not only the recipient
but also the data type before disclosure. The result is
also in line with [4] which showed the influence of the
type of information, contextual actor (recipient) and
purpose of information; the study also showed
‘sensitivity’ is subjectively influenced by contextual
factors.
Thus, in this study, we venture on the following
research question:
RQ: What are the effects of the relevance of
information types to different recipient, on the
willingness to disclose? (Figure 1)
In this paper, we undertake a study to investigate
the relationship of data type and its relevance on the
willingness to disclose to specific groups of recipients.
Distinct from other similar studies [4, 26] which utilize
generic data types, our study is more specific to mobile
device usage where we derive data types from mobile
users.

Information
type

Willingness
to disclose

Sender

Recipient
Relevance
to recipient

Figure 1: Influence of information relevance
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3. Study 1

4.

3.1 Methodology

5.

We located existing studies [4, 26] that are closest
to the purpose of our study, to examine a varying
willingness of disclosure on the different data type.
The lists of data type adapted in those studies were
derived from [27] and [28], respectively. We initially
considered to adapt the measures from those sources;
however, we later found the derivation methods behind
[27] and [28] to be not sufficiently transparent. We
also consider the lists to be generic and may not be
pervasive in mobile device usage. This entails the
necessity of enumerating a list of information types
commonly disclosed by mobile users, so that Study 2
can be conducted based on empirical results.
To improve the relevance of the responses, we pretested the questionnaire over several iterations, each
time with improvement on the question’s clarity. To
avoid priming the participants, we took precaution to
avoid “privacy” keyword in our questionnaire’s title
and description, and in the questions (refer to
Appendix for questionnaire sample).
We advertised the survey on Mechanical Turk for
nine days in May 2019. Participants were asked to
respond to our survey that we implemented on
LimeSurvey. Participants spent 3 min and 57 seconds
on average (median = 3 minutes 15 seconds) to
complete the survey. Participants were paid USD 0.10
for completing the survey. Mechanical Turk enabled us
to recruit hundreds of participants that are more diverse
than a university sample (that is often used as a
convenience sample) [29-31] within a reasonable
timeframe [32]. The questionnaires (including Study
2’s) were approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee of our institution (equivalent to IRB
approval in the US) before the recruitment of
participants.
We utilized the following measures to minimize
irrelevant data:
1. The survey is only shown to workers from the US
location. Location is also part of the demographic
questions, and only responses that specified the
US were considered valid.
2. Respondents were required to input a password
that was only shown at completion to get paid.
We cross-checked responses from Mechanical
Turk and LimeSurvey to identify invalid
responses with a blank or incorrect password.
Respondents were not able to leave any blank
answer.
3. We identified incomplete or out of topic
responses.

We identified responses with unrealistic
completion times.
We identified responses that have the same IP
address. We were aware that respondents could
share a public IP address when behind a Network
Address Translation (NAT) gateway. They are
further inspected using measure 1-4 to verify their
validity.

3.2 Result
We had a total of 435 responses from LimeSurvey.
With all the measures above, we removed 45 responses
and had 390 usable responses. Table 1 summarizes
participant demographics in Study 1.
Table 1: Demographics of Study 1
Attribute
Distribution
Gender
Male (31.03%, n = 121), Female
(68.97%, n = 269)
Age
18-25 (20.77%, n = 81), 26-35
(37.95%, n = 148), 36-45 (21.79%,
n = 85), 46-55 (13.33%, n = 52), 56
or above (6.15%, n = 24)
Education
Less than high school (1.42%, n =
4), High school (34.04%, n = 96),
Bachelor’s (48.23%, n = 136),
Honours/Master’s (14.18%, n = 40),
Doctorate (2.13%, n = 6)
Employment Student (5.38%, n = 21), Employed
(58.97%, n = 230), Self-employed
(13.33%, n = 52), Employed student
(6.15%, n = 24), Unemployed
(12.057%, n = 47), Retired (4.1%, n
= 16)
Mobile
Android (49.49%, n = 193), iOS
(42.31%, n = 165), Android and
iOS (4.62%, n = 18), Others
(3.59%, n = 14)
Experience
0-1 year (2.82%, n = 11), 2-4 years
(15.13%, n = 59), 5-7 years
(31.03%, n = 121), 8 years or more
(51.03%, n = 199)
We asked the respondents to list the names of each
group of their contacts. The responses were given in
free text form, resulting in a wide variety of names. We
combined the responses from those two questions and
performed validation; the word frequencies of all
groups fits a power-law distribution with α = 1.83, p =
0.02. It is similar to observed distributions for English
word frequencies (i.e. Moby Dick (α = 1.95) [33]).
When counting the names, capitalization and
punctuation differences were ignored, but no stemming
was performed.
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Questionnaire:
List five types of information/data that you put
into your mobile device.
2. What other identifying information does your
mobile device capture about you?
Next, related types were identified and combined
for a smaller and more practical list. We coded specific
apps into their relevant categories. Some categories are
further aggregated together by similar functionality or
synonyms to reduce the number of groups. Table 2
illustrates some examples. This combination resulted in
43 types where each type has a frequency of at least
10. Table 3 shows the 15 most popular types of
information.
1.

Table 2: Compilation of types
Types
New types
Final types
photos of family photos of family personal
photos
pictures of me
and my children
photos of my photos of pet
dog
photos of my
cat
my
facebook facebook
social media
information
my tweets on twitter
twitter
snapchat videos snapchat
and photos
my
physical fitness
health
activity
step counter
body movement
how i sleep
health
heart beats per
minute

4. Study 2
4.1 Measures
RQ: What are the effects of the relevance of
information types to different recipient, on the
willingness to disclose?
We investigate the influence of recipient and type
of information on mobile device users. Specifically, we
examine the propensity to disclose certain types of
information to particular recipients and how much do
they think the information is necessary or relevant to
that recipient.
Table 3: 15 most popular types
Types of information
Frequency
personal photos
325

social media
location
contacts
health
entertainment
photos
banking
emails
texts
games
shopping
chat
passwords
browsing history

285
236
197
146
136
127
107
103
97
97
96
95
80
79

We asked participants to rate their willingness to
disclose certain types of information towards each
contacts group and how necessary do they think. To
measure willingness to disclose, we adapted four 7point scales from [34]. We measure perceived
relevance by using three 7-point scales adapted from
[25] (see Appendix for complete questionnaire). We
assessed their reliability and deemed the constructs to
have an acceptable level [35, 36] of internal
consistency, i.e. Cronbach’s α values are 0.94 and 0.90
respectively. During the study, each respondent was
given three vignettes to respond, where each vignette is
a combination of types of information and contact
groups.
We compiled a list of five possible types of
information and 15 possible contact groups from Study
1 and another user study [19] which we conducted to
investigate the influence of trust and privacy concern
on self-disclosure from privacy paradox’s perspective.
Since the resulting 75 combinations were too large to
fit into a questionnaire, we divided them into three
questionnaires instead. In each sub-questionnaire, we
used five out of the 15 contact groups, while the types
of information remained constant, resulting in 25
possible combinations.
To avoid repeat participations, the subquestionnaires were conducted consecutively, and we
utilized TurkPrime (later rebranded as CloudResearch)
to distribute surveys on MTurk. TurkPrime enabled us
to exclude previous participants (Workers) from
participating in subsequent studies.

4.2 Methodology
We advertised the questionnaires on Mechanical
Turk for eight days in July 2019. Participants were
asked to respond to our survey that we implemented on
LimeSurvey. Participants spent 2 min and 20 seconds
on average (median = 2 minutes 4 seconds) to
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complete the survey. Participants were paid USD 0.10
for completing the survey. We utilized similar
measures as Study 1’s to minimize junk data.
We performed several regression diagnostics to
validate the regression analysis. The Durbin-Watson
statistic value was 1.99 (p > 0.6), suggesting no
significant presence of autocorrelation. The Cook’s
distance value was 0.002, thus no evidence to suggest
there were highly influential outliers.
We had a total of 3444 responses from
LimeSurvey. We utilized similar measures as Study 1’s
to minimize junk data and removed 555 responses, thus
remained with 2889 usable responses. Before the data
analysis, we converted the Likert to a range of -3 to +3.
Table 4 shows the participants demographics.
Correlation analysis showed that perceived
relevance is significantly correlated with selfdisclosure in both frequent and infrequent groups
(Spearman r = 0.48, p < 0.001). The regression model
showed relevance explained 26% of the variance in
willingness to disclose (Table 5).

5. Discussion
Table 4: Demographics of Study 2
Attribute
Distribution
Gender
Male (36.76%, n = 1062), Female
(63.24%, n = 1827)
Age
18-25 (22.26%, n = 643), 26-35
(40.15%, n = 1160), 36-45 (20.84%,
n = 602), 46-55 (10.76%, n = 311),
56 or above (5.99%, n = 173)
Education
Less than high school (0.69%, n =
20), High school (41.36%, n =
1195), Bachelor’s (43.86%, n =
1267), Honours/Master’s (12.22%,
n = 353), Doctorate (1.87%, n = 54)
Employment Student (7.41%, n = 214),
Employed (57.29%, n = 1655), Selfemployed (11.15%, n = 322),
Employed student (7.75%, n = 224),
Self-employed student (1.14%, n =
33), Unemployed (12.77%, n =
369), Retired (2.49%, n = 72)
Mobile
Android (49.43%, n = 1428), iOS
(44.58%, n = 1288), Android and
iOS (5.02%, n = 145), Others
(0.97%, n = 28)
Experience
0-1 year (2.28%, n = 66), 2-4 years
(11.46%, n = 331), 5-7 years
(32.43%, n = 937), 8 years or more
(53.82%, n = 1555)

Table 5: Regression effect of relevance on
willingness to disclose
Criterion
Willingness to
disclose
Relevance
0.52 (p < 0.001)
R2
.26
Adjusted R2
.26
Significance
<0.001
Standard Error of Estimate 1.679
F-statistic
(1,8665) = 2972
As part of our investigation on the relevance of the
contextual integrity to the mobile ecosystem, especially
the privacy aspect. In the previous study, we
investigate the influence of recipients—a contextual
factor—on the users’ privacy attitude. The results
suggest that the different propensity of trust towards
recipients can influence self-disclosure, despite having
a privacy concern.
In this paper, we studied the effect of a combination
of contextual factors—recipients and type of
information—on users’ attitude. Specifically, we
investigated how a combination of those factors can
affect users’ willingness to disclose and their
perception of information relevance. From the results,
we observed another form of privacy paradox—higher
sensitivity does not necessarily result in lower
disclosure. For instance, information types that are
considered to be highly sensitive like health-related
information and location [27] are not ranked in the
lower half of the disclosure index (Table 6). Those
types even rank higher in disclosure index than social
media information, a type that is previously considered
to be low sensitivity [37]. Previous studies posit that
the paradox can be explained by information relevance
[1, 25] which is a focus of this study.
Table 6: Average indexes of difference types
Type
Disclosure
Relevance
Index
Index
Contacts
-0.73
-0.03
Health-related
-0.16
0.34
Information
Location
0.15
0.42
Personal Photos
-0.54
-0.14
Social
Media
-0.41
-0.12
Activity
-0.8

Disclosure Index

0.2

-0.15

Relevance Index

0.5

Each index column is color-coded separately
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We investigated the relationship between
willingness to disclose and perceived relevance. The
result suggests the user is more likely to disclose a
piece of information when it is perceived as relevance
and mostly in line with existing studies. While the
results suggest a significant relationship, it does not
necessarily hold true in some instances. For instance,
participants tend to perceive health-related information
to be quite related on average, yet there is a slight
resistance in disclosure (Table 6). When looking at
different combinations of information type and
recipient, we notice that while participants perceived
“Contacts” and “Personal Photos” to be slightly
relevant to “Commercial Organizations”, yet they
reacted strongly against disclosing those pieces of
information to that group (Table 10). While the
recipient group with the highest relevance index also
has the highest disclosure index and vice versa, we do
not observe a similar trend in information type. The
information type with the highest relevance index also
has the highest disclosure index, but the one with the
lowest relevance index does not have the lowest
disclosure index (Table 6 & Table 7).
Disclosure index may seem to be distinct between
information types (Table 6). However, when we split it
into different groups of the recipient, the distinction
becomes erratic. For instance, when we compare
“Contacts”—the information type with the lowest
disclosure index (-0.73) on average—across different
recipients, the value ranges from -1.61 to 0.49 (Table
8). Even though it is the lowest on average, when
comparing across recipients, we notice it is not
necessarily the lowest. In fact, it is only the lowest in
two out of nine recipients. A similar discrepancy is
also apparent in the Relevance index. Take “Location”
for example, which has the highest relevance index
(0.42), when divided into varying recipients, the value
ranges from -0.05 to 1.02 (Table 9). It is highest only
in three out of nine recipient groups.

6. Conclusion
Findings from our studies in this paper highlighted
the influence of contextual factors—recipient and
information type—on information exchange within the
mobile ecosystem. The findings consequently lead to
two practical implications; first, our results cast doubt
over the established effects of “sensitivity” and its
usefulness in PET. Existing studies [38, 39] posit that
the significant relationship between sensitivity and
willingness to disclose. If this assumption holds true,
we can expect a consistent response in willingness to
disclose a type of information across recipients. This
study, however, could not reproduce such consistency
(Table 8) and further demonstrate that sensitivity can

vary according to the intended recipient. Second, while
there is evidence of a significant relationship between
information relevance and disclosure, several
discrepancies showed the relationship is not always
clear-cut. Thus, we urge researchers to practice caution
over the use of generic information relevance in
predicting the tendency to disclose.
Table 7: Average indexes of different groups
Group
Disclosure
Relevance
Index
Index
Acquaintances
-0.32
-0.04
Commercial
-0.99
0.15
Organizations
Education
-0.39
0.15
Institutions
Employers
-0.59
-0.16
Family
0.84
0.74
Financial
-1.13
-0.45
Institutions
Friends
0.55
0.47
Healthcare
-0.20
0.18
Organizations
Non-profit
-0.76
-0.15
Organizations
-1.2

Disclosure Index

0.8

-0.5

Relevance Index

0.7

Each index column is color-coded separately

While not part of the main research question of this
study, we also examined the demographical
differences. In this study, we did not find any
significant difference between genders in propensity in
disclosing information, nor in most demographics. This
is contrary to our previous study and in turn, a study by
Li, et al. [40]. We theorize that the initial difference
information disclosure behavior diminishes and reacted
similarly as users take into consideration of
information relevance. A notable exception is that
there is evidence of a significant difference between
age groups. Future study can examine more closely in
how different age groups perceive information
relevance.
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Disclosure

Contacts

Acquaintances
Commercial
Organizations
Education
Institutions
Employers
Family
Financial
Institutions
Friends
Healthcare
Organizations
Non-profit
Organizations

-0.70

Table 8: Average disclosure index
HealthLocation
Personal
related
Photos
Information
-0.76
-0.63
0.32

Social
Media
Activity
0.15

-1.61

-0.99

-0.29

-1.36

-0.85

-0.76

0.02

0.32

-1.17

-0.47

-0.76
0.49

-0.01
1.19

0.12
1.04

-1.26
0.80

-1.11
0.71

-1.60

-1.25

0.18

-1.70

-1.28

0.09

0.19

0.58

1.13

0.67

-0.54

0.95

0.47

-1.03

-0.72

-1.15

-0.49

-0.45

-1.11

-0.69

Relevance

Contacts

Acquaintances
Commercial
Organizations
Education
Institutions
Employers
Family
Financial
Institutions
Friends
Healthcare
Organizations
Non-profit
Organizations

-0.03

Table 9: Average relevance index
HealthLocation
Personal
related
Photos
Information
-0.20
-0.05
0.11

Social
Media
Activity
-0.02

0.07

-0.01

0.55

-0.01

0.07

0.00

0.62

0.40

-0.36

0.07

-0.32
0.44

0.54
1.30

0.15
1.02

-0.67
0.65

-0.55
0.30

-0.34

-0.69

0.34

-1.00

-0.63

0.28

0.42

0.65

0.62

0.35

0.03

1.16

0.66

-0.37

-0.50

-0.32

0.09

-0.01

-0.39

-0.17

-1.7

1.2

-1

1.4

Table 10: Differences in disclosure and relevance indexes
Disclosure-Relevance

Contacts

Location

Personal
Photos

Social Media
Activity

0.67

Healthrelated
Information
0.56

Acquaintances
Commercial
Organizations
Education Institutions
Employers
Family
Financial Institutions
Friends
Healthcare
Organizations
Non-profit
Organizations

0.58

0.21

0.17

1.68

0.98

0.84

1.34

0.92

0.76
0.45
0.05
1.26
0.19

0.60
0.55
0.10
0.56
0.23

0.08
0.03
0.02
0.17
0.07

0.81
0.59
0.14
0.70
0.50

0.54
0.56
0.42
0.64
0.32

0.57

0.21

0.19

0.66

0.22

0.83

0.58

0.43

0.72

0.52

0.02

1.7
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In this work, we recruited participants through a
crowdsourcing platform. Future work could consider
more crowdsourcing or recruitment platforms to obtain
larger datasets. Our recruitment process did not involve
choosing sample users randomly and might lead to
selection bias. Alternative approaches that enable the
use of random sampling include web scraping and
application programming interfaces (APIs) provided by
the social media platforms that we can utilize to gauge
public sentiments on the desired topics. Larger datasets
combining with more sophisticated modelling could
help uncover constructs that are not observable from
the limited datasets utilized in this work. Since the
participants involved in this work only expressed their
views at a certain point in time, a longitudinal study
can be conducted to evaluate whether the preferences
could change over time.
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Appendix
Study 1
1. List five types of information/data that you
put into your mobile device.
2. What other identifying information does your
mobile device capture about you?
Study 2
Disclosure: Seven-point semantic scales [34]
Please specify the extent to which you would reveal
<TYPE> to <GROUP>, on the scales that follow.
1. Unlikely / likely
2. Not probable / probable
3. Possible / impossible (r)
4. Willing / unwilling (r)
Relevance: Seven-point semantic scales [25]
Please indicate the extent of each factor for your above
response.
1. Irrelevant / Relevant
2. Important / Unimportant (r)
3. Unnecessary / Necessary
(r): Reverse item
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